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STATE APPELLATE COURTS.
AND THE 'POLITICAL PROCESS:
FLORIDA AND THE PUBLIC FORUM
D.

GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.*

In peaceable and quiet times, our legal rights are in little danger of
being overborne; but when the wave of power lashes itself into violence
and rage, and goes surging up against the barriers which were made to
confine it, then we need the whole strength of an unbroken Constitution
to save us from destruction.'
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INTRODUCTION

Ever since Robert Yates penned his objections to the proposed Su-

preme Court of the United States in The Letters of Brutus,2 scholars and
journalists, lawyers and politicians have devoted page after page of book

after book to this tribunal. Today, even a mediocre library contains dozens
of biographies of justices, analyses of their decisions, and commentaries
on Court procedures. The Court has fascinated Americans and mystified
foreigners, and perhaps no other institution in the land has attracted so
much deification, vilification, praise and abuse for so long a time and from
so many different corners of society. From varying perspectives the Court
has appeared in American constitutional history as both savior and destroyer, hero and villain, protector and ravager. The Court, then, has
suffered from no want of attention.
For all the interest in this tribunal, very little attention has focused
on the fifty state appellate court systems in the United States. Scholars
have traditionally devoted more of their time to the national government
than to the labyrinth of state governments. Even within the study of state
governments, writers and researchers have spared only a relatively few
* A.B., 1964, Davidson College; M.A., 1966, Ph.D., 1967, Princeton University. Mr.
Stephenson is presently in military service, assigned to The Advanced Research and Study
Group, National War College. This article expresses his own views.
1. Jeremiah Black, counsel for petitioner, Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 75-76

(1866).
2. The letters are contained as an appendix in E. CoRwIN,

231-262 (1938).
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pages to state court systems. A glance through any one of several textbooks on state and local government usually reveals at the most two
chapters on the judiciary, and some offer only one.'
At this point, one might suggest that if scholars have generally neglected state courts over the years, the neglect has been deserved.4 The
inference is that state courts have so little to do with matters of import
that serious researchers might better spend their energies on cases and
institutions where judges grapple with the central issues of the time and
make crucial decisions which affect the lives of millions. The argument is
sound, but the application is faulty.
The point is that in this country the Supreme Court makes political,
i.e., policy, decisions. Do state courts? The indications are that state
courts are very much involved in the policy life of the country, for state
courts make or fail to make decisions which affect their jurisdictions. No
one can deny that the state trial and appellate courts handle millions of
cases every year involving such important matters as crimes, contracts,
insurance, torts, corporations, and estates. Decisions in these areas apply,
re-shape and create rules governing hundreds of millions of dollars and
millions of persons.5
Even admitting the policy implications of state court decisions, one
might question the wisdom of studying one or several state supreme
courts rather than the United States Supreme Court. Knowledge of the
rulings from the state benches is crucial for a lawyer, but of what significance is it to the student of politics? If one wishes to study the ways in
which courts function, why not concentrate one's labors on the United
States Supreme Court rather than examine the less glamorous and often
more obscure actions of state courts?
Such a query suggests that what one knows about a single American
court-here, the Supreme Court-might just as easily be applied to an3. In one of the more recent textbooks, less than twenty out of five hundred pages are
devoted to state courts. The example is the rule, not the exception. See DEMOCRACY IN THE
FIFTY STATES (C. Press & 0. Williams, eds., 1966). But since the book is a collection of readings, perhaps the blame for the scarcity of published material on state courts should not fall
on the editors.
4. Of course, books and articles on state courts are not entirely lacking. Some studies,
for example, have demonstrated how state courts have responded to social and economic

needs over time. See J. HURST, LAW AND THE
UNITED STATES (1956) and THE GROWTH OF

CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN 19TH CENTURY
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS (1950).

Some scholars have applied the more "scientific" tools to the study of state courts. See
G. Schubert, The Packing of the Michigan Supreme Court, in QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 129-141 (1959); Keefe, Judges and Politics: The Pennsylvania Plan of
Judge Selection, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 621 (1959) ; Nagel, Sociometric Relations Among American Courts, 43 S.W. Soc. Q. 136 (1962) ; Nagel, Unequal Party Representation on the State
Supreme Courts, 45 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 62 (1961); Mott, Judicial Influence, 30 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 295 (1936); Ulmer, The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court,
11 J. PUB. L. 352 (1962).
Historical studies include, M. NELSON, A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN VIRGINIA, 17891928 (1947); F. SMITH, JUDICILL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK, 1906-1938 (1952).

5. The probability is that state courts affect and effect policy, "not as a matter of choice'
but of function." J. PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 3 (1955).
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other court, state or federal, in the American political system. But there
is little evidence that what is true of one court is necessarily true of another. Granted the policy significance of state courts, one is justified in
analyzing their actions and inactions if the chance exists that knowledge
about the Supreme Court is not necessarily knowledge about the fifty state
appellate court systems in the United States.
In this light, this article studies public forum cases before the state
appellate judiciary of Florida.6 From an examination of leading cases in
the law of the public forum in Florida, the author then offers several conclusions and hypotheses relating to the operation of state courts generally.' The author makes no claim to complete understanding of state judiciaries from an analysis of a series of cases in a single state. However, the
reaction of the Florida appellate courts to cases involving the public
forum does highlight the common points of the role of the state judiciary
in the American political system and the policy implications of the actions
and inactions of state courts.
II.

PUBLIC PROPERTY AS A PUBLIC FORUM

A.
1.

The Public Pathways
POLITICAL EXHORTATIONS

The use of streets and parks for expression of one's ideas has been a
part of American political history since the early years of the Republic.
The town meeting in New England and the courthouse rally in the South
have brought citizens together to hear neighbors and long-winded politicians speak on the issues, fears and hopes of the day. The campaign barbecue, the sidewalk sermon, and the Fourth of July oration have held
forth on the streets and parks across the land, each reflecting in a special
way some aspect of the American culture.
The accessibility of this ready-made public forum provides more
than a political safety valve, however, for the hot air of community complainers, cajolers and candidates. The forum can be the germination point
for the introduction of new ideas in a locale. So long as a community
remains relatively homogeneous, perhaps some citizens take for granted
the public forum within their midst. But when disturbingly new and conflicting ideas make their appearance, the public forum becomes a fertile
ground in which dissident and revolutionary elements can prosper. In the
South following the Civil War, many notions foreign to the people paraded before the public eye. Socialism and Darwinism stepped onto the
6. As applied here, "public forum" includes picketing, meetings and demonstrations on
public property, usually on streets and in parks. The term excludes similar actions on private
property, such as most of the segregation "sit-ins." Detailed treatment of most labor picketing
cases is omitted, since the study of labor law has traditionally been separate from that of
the public forum.
7. The author interviewed judges and attorneys as part of his research. No specific citations are given to the interviews, however, for anonymity was usually a precondition of
frank discussion.
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Southern stage, and the political turmoil after 1865 produced rivalry
among more traditional ideologies such as populism, democracy, and
republicanism.
The influx of new ideas and the rejuvenation of old ones had even
more dramatic impact because of the growing urbanization of the period.
Farm villages were expanding, and cities and towns were witnessing increasing congestion, as an exploding commerce out-distanced the limited
capabilities of narrow streets and obsolete lines of communication. As
crowding continued, regulation of street activities appeared reasonable
because, after all, political and religious meetings might unduly hinder
the use of the streets by pedestrian customers. And given the presence of
obnoxious causes and ideas with their heralds and peddlers, the street
ordinance was a convenient way to keep the prophets, the disinherited
and the saviors out of public view.'
There were no early Florida appellate court cases concerning the
streets as a public forum. Municipalities had ordinances proscribing disorderly conduct, and despite a few lower court convictions for unruly
out-spokenness in the streets, interest and funds were apparently insufficient for an appeal. At any rate, Floridians lacked a soapbox tradition for
unpopular and seemingly threatening ideas. In the absence of such a tradition, however, there arose those political creatures more than willing to
beget one. C.T. Anderson, for one, ran afoul of a Panama City ordinance
in 1920 because he refused to secure a permit to speak on the streets from
the city fathers.' ° His political convictions and his enthusiasm to share
them with others cost him one hundred dollars and presented the Supreme
Court of Florida with its first review of a public forum case.
8. For a history of regulations on street and park meetings, see G. ABERNATHY, THE
RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION (1961).

9. The United States Supreme Court at first maintained a bands-off policy with regard
to state legislation regulating the public forum. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1876) ; Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). The Court could do little with
the question until it incorporated the first amendment into the fourteenth.
In its first free speech foray into the tangled mass of street and park ordinances, the
Supreme Court voided a municipal ordinance which required a permit to distribute literature
on the streets. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). In Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939), the Court struck down several ordinances which had permitted a city to exercise
arbitrary control over political expression under the guise of simple police regulations.
In another series of cases, the Court refused to countenance ordinances which in effect
provided municipal officials with censorship powers or which flatly prohibited all political
expression on the streets or from house to house. Ordinances regulating hours for handbill
distribution and requiring registration for solicitors were one thing; ordinances promoting
censorship of the applicant's views or forbidding their dissemination on the streets were
something else altogether. See Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
10. Anderson v. Tedford, 80 Fla. 376, 85 So. 673 (1920). The ordinance read:
No person or persons shall hold any public meeting or meetings of any character
upon any of the streets of the city or within any of the city parks without first
obtaining permission in writing from the mayor or from a majority of the city
councilmen.
Id. at 377, 85 So. at 673.
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Anderson argued that the ordinance was invalid because the limitations placed upon him violated his freedom of speech. More specifically,
he contended that the licensing provision placed unbridled discretion in
the hands of the city officials. Mr. Justice Ellis wrote the opinion for the
Florida court and dwelt almost exclusively with the second argumentthe possibility of arbitrary discrimination.
Ellis accepted Anderson's characterization of the Panama City ordinance, which specified no factors for the licensing officials to consider, as
unreasonable and void. He noted that such "discretion, vested in the
mayor or a 'majority of the city councilmen,' is uncontrolled by any
definite and reasonable terms upon which the permit may be granted.""
Those officials are empowered to grant or withhold permission
to hold meetings in the streets or parks of the city without inquiring into the character of persons applying for permit, the
purpose of the meeting or assembly, nor its effects upon the business, traffic, or peace and quiet of the city, but may for reasons
entirely personal grant permission to any person and withhold
it from another, and as the religious or political proclivities of
the head of the city administration changes [sic] he may grant
permission to a representative of one sect and deny it to another, and withhold permission from a person of one political
faction and grant it to another of different persuasion.' 2
Continuing, Justice Ellis asked how one would interpret this ordinance. "All laws and regulations to be valid for any purpose must be capable of construction, but this ordinance is incapable of construction."'
Interpretation depended solely on the man, for the statute itself provided no guidelines. The law thus made it possible "for an official in the
name of law to violate recognized principles of legal and equal rights." 4
Then, perhaps in a jibe at the mayor and council of Panama City,
Ellis added:
In some municipalities governed by what they claim to be a
superior system for regulation of municipal affairs, the entire
business portion of the principal streets is so completely given
over to use by the owners of a certain class of vehicles for
parking and repairs as often to block the streets and render the
use of them by the public often impossible and usually difficult
11. id. at 377, 85 So. at 673.
12. Id. at 377-78, 85 So. at 673-74.
13. Id. at 380, 85 So. at 674. The court noted here that the ordinance was also without
charter authorization, but this ground for reversal was outside the broader reasoning of the
opinion.
14. Id. But the legal process could not eliminate altogether the element of discretion.
Even judges were not immune for "judges are men. And men are pretty much like all of us,"
Murphy, Free Speech and the Interest in Local Law and Order, 1 J. PuB. L. 40, 70 (1952),

and, "no scheme of human policy can be so contrived and guarded but that something must
be left to the integrity, prudence and wisdom of those who govern." Seabury, Letters of a
Westchester Farmer (1774-1775), 8 PUBLICATIONS WESTCHESTER COUNTY HIST. Soc'Y 121
(1930).
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and dangerous. In comparison with such practice it would seem
that a meeting of a few citizens upon a street corner to discuss
some social, political or religious topic would be too insignificant
to be noticed.' 5
Faced in the briefs with what appeared to be arbitrary enforcement
of the ordinance, the Florida court was quick to remove the power from
the city officials. Seeing unequal treatment in Anderson's case, the power
was obviously too dangerous to assign to fallible humans without meaningful standards for application. Had the Panama City ordinance specified particular factors and conditions to guide and direct the mayor and
councilmen, the Florida court might have rejected Anderson's objections.
On its face, however, the ordinance contained no beacon lights for interpretation, and so the Supreme Court of Florida did to the Panama City
statute in 1920 what the Supreme Court of the United States was to do to
an ordinance from Griffin, Georgia, in 1938.16

The Anderson opinion did not explicitly indicate the court's attitude
toward an ordinance which would place a blanket ban on street activity
at certain places or at all places, at certain times or at all times. The
opinion, however, did imply that any prohibition would have to have a
reasonable relation to some tangible public or private mischief which the
law sought to prevent. Presumably, a complete or partial ban so unrelated
also would be unreasonable. While the opinion did not give weighty attention to the constitutionality of street legislation, it evidently presumed
such constitutionality. The court probably would have agreed that the
municipality had clear authority to regulate the activities of the public
forum.
2.

RELIGIOUS SOLICITATIONS

Anticipating by two decades the federal decisions regarding Jehovah's Witnesses, the Supreme Court of Florida had already set the constitutional law of the state against arbitrary permit ordinances before the
first Witness cases confronted the state bench. A wave of such cases
washed ashore between 1941 and 1943, and reasoned opinions by the
Florida justices advanced the state's law of the public forum.' 7
15. 80 Fla. at 380, 85 So. at 674.
16. The case was Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
17. Especially in the South, where religion was so much a part of the culture, litigation
related to religious questions was guaranteed to generate attention.
A controversy under any one of the civil liberties . . . is always accompanied by
a jealous truculence, but none can attain that consuming passion which attends
every disputation of a question even remotely connected with religion. Men who
usually are oblivious and indifferent to the problems before our courts are quick to
scrutinize and criticize a comment of the law which contains but a thread of religion
being woven into the legal fabric. Emotions, prejudices and passions flare, rendering reasonable men unmanageable, learned men incoherent and resolute men
incorrigible.
Comment, Statute Requiring Permit for Parades on Public Streets, 21 B.U.L. REV. 540,
(1941).
On Jehovah's Witnesses, see Barber, Religious Liberty v. Police Power: Jehovah's
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C. A. Stephens and his son had brought suit against the city officials
of Melbourne to enjoin enforcement of an ordinance which prohibited
distribution of literature at specified intersections.'" The purpose of the
law was one of safety and convenience. Automobiles stopped momentarily at traffic lights provided a convenient opportunity for pedestrian
solicitors to reach the motorists with handbills and other printed matter,
for one was likely to miss these same people by a distribution operation
confined solely to the sidewalk. But trotting alongside creeping or halted
cars was dangerous, and it was troublesome and inconvenient for motorists to have someone tapping on the glass, or on warm days thrusting an
unrequested piece of literature through the open window.
Citing Hague v. Committee for IndustrialOrganization,9 the Florida
Supreme Court noted that although liberty of speech or of the press was
one of "the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States which
shall not be restrained or abridged.
,"" man had created his government with the primary duty of preserving human life and safety, so that
"guaranteed human liberties may be fully enjoyed, each within its intended sphere of operation."'" The court reasoned that because the
framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that "the exercise of such
guaranteed liberties shall jeopardize human life or safety, ' 22 the enjoyment of the former depended upon the preservation of the latter. The
court stated:
Certainly the constitution does not intend that the exercise of
its guaranteed civil liberties shall subordinate reasonable regulations for the preservation of human life and safety. The organic
command that no law shall restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech or of the press does not by its terms or intendments contemplate that the exercise of such liberty in the distribution of
literature to occupants of motor vehicles by persons on foot
Witnesses, 41 Am. PoL. Sci. REV. 226 (1947); R. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR (1962).
Jehovah's Witnesses antagonized the population in the twentieth century much as the
Mormons had done in the late nineteenth. The Mormon elders "were regarded as more evil
than the carpetbaggers." Enraged citizens "began to tickle them and the converts with
hickory twigs." No appellate case resulted from the persecution of the Mormons, for most
of the pressure against them was informal or extra-legal, though pressure nonetheless. T.
CLARK, THE SOUTHERN COUNTRY EDITOR 258, 259 (1948).

18. Stephens v. Stickel, 146 Fla. 104, 200 So. 396 (1941). The Melbourne ordinance
listed certain intersections.
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to stand or go upon that portion of
the aforementioned street intersections and crossings, commonly used for vehicular
or other motor traffic to distribute handbills, pamphlets, dodgers or other literature
to the occupant of any automobile . . . or other motor vehicle while said motor
vehicle is in motion or while the same is stopped at or near such street intersections
and crossings, because of a traffic light, traffic signal, or traffic conditions, or to
go thereupon for any other purpose than that commonly accorded to the general
traveling public.
Id. at 108, 200 So. at 397.
19. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
20. 146 Fla. at 109, 200 So. at 398.
21. Id. at 109-110, 200 So. at 398.
22. Id. at 110, 200 So. at 398.
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operating within street intersections or crossings shall be superior to reasonable duly authorized regulations of motor Vehicle
traffic at stated city street intersections for the protection of
human life and safety, all other portions of the streets and all
sidewalks being
open for the exercise of the liberty claimed, as
23
in this case.

The reasonableness of the statute thus depended "upon a full consideration of all pertinent facts affecting the operation of the ordinance
and its consequences under controlling law."2 4 And the consideration
would go beneath the mere language of the law, so that "the organic privilege should not, under the guise of regulations, be in fact and in law unduly restrained or abridged."2 5
This stated, the Florida court remanded the case for further proceedings in which Stephens eventually lost his petition. But won or lost,
the Florida justices had elaborated on their decision in Anderson in the
light of federal rulings such as Hague and Cantwell v. Connecticut.26 The
court recognized the civil liberties of speech and press but also proclaimed the primary function of streets as one of public passage. Other
activities, therefore, took second place to the interest of the public in
safety and convenience. Had the reverse been true and the right of
speech on the streets primary, public passage would have made way for
free speech, and municipal authorities would have been concerned with
protecting those politically and religiously committed from the hazards
of traffic and the tempers of pestered motorists.
But even with passage coming first, the court considered the exercise
of free speech sufficiently important to require that any traffic regulation
bearing upon that civil liberty directly relate to motor safety. Recognizing
that distribution at intersections represented a rapid, if risky, way to
reach a particular segment of the population with one's ideas, the court
prophesied that not just any ordinance would pass. The requirement was
reasonableness, and the term had endless implications. It was indicated
by the Florida court that a statute would fall short of the requirement if
the law prohibited sidewalk speech and distribution when evidence of
obstruction or danger was lacking. While the primary function of the
streets was public passage, no ordinance governing behavior on the streets
necessarily took primacy over the constitutional guarantees of free
expression.
The conflict between municipal authority and free speech reached
the Supreme Court of Florida a second time during that year.2 7 Mrs. E. F.
Wilson and Grace Shadman sought a writ of habeas corpus following
their conviction for distributing literature on the streets without a permit
23. Id.
24. Id.

25. Id.
26. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
27. State ex rel. Wilson v. Russell, 146 Fla. 539, 1 So.2d 569 (1941).
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from the chief of the Clearwater police department.2 8 The ordinance involved was like the one which the United States Supreme Court had
voided in Lovell v. City of Griffin2 three years before, and Wilson and
Shadman based their petition on this precedent.3"
For the Supreme Court of Florida, the petition illuminated in full
detail a picture of unconstitutionality. The court found that little elaboration was required:
If so much had not been recently written by the Supreme Court
of the United States and become the recognized law of the land,
it might be expedient to express our views in regard to the validity of this ordinance at some length, but ordinances of this sort
have been considered and discussed in lengthy opinions ...

and

such ordinances definitely held to be invalid because of invading
the right of free speech and free press as guaranteed under the
Constitution, and it appears to us that no useful purpose can be
served by attempting to repeat or add to what has been said in
that regard by the highest Court in the land .... 31
Justice Chapman, however, thought the case worthy of more detailed discussion. He cited the city's arguments for upholding the ordinance as examples of mass hysteria which stifled freedom during
tempestuous times. Clearwater's counsel called the ordinance a war measure, to prohibit the teaching of all doctrines advocating disobedience to
the laws of the state. The ordinance also served, supposedly, to suppress
those who refused to salute the American flag and who preached civil
anarchy. These aims, counsel said, strengthened the national defense posture because they would eliminate the influence of Jehovah's Witnesses in
the community.32
Chapman felt that Wilson and Shadman deserved more than a discharge from custody. Justice demanded a judicial rebuke to the Clearwater counsel for his arguments and to the city for the ordinance.
These several arguments offered in behalf of the challenged
ordinance are weighty and if presented to a legislative body,
would not only be influential but convincing, or if made on the hustings would be approved and applauded by the people, but a
court in the discharge of duty under our system is required to be
28. Id.
29. The ordinance read: "That from and after the passage of this ordinance it shall be
unlawful for any person to distribute pamphlets, circulars, or other similar printed or typewritten matter among citizens of the City of Clearwater without first securing a permit
from the Chief of Police." Id. at 540, 1 So.2d at 569.
Since Jehovah's Witnesses claimed to act upon the direct authority of God, they felt
immune to rules of the temporal sphere. To request a permit, even if one was forthcoming
as a matter of course, was a violation of principle for them.
30. The Anderson decision of 1920 was precedent for the Witnesses, but their counsel
stressed the federal cases. Likewise the justices looked to the same and passed over their own
landmark opinion.
31. 146 Fla. at 540-41, 1 So.2d at 569-570.
32. Id. at 541, 1 So.2d at 570 (concurring opinion).
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oblivious to public clamor, partisan demands, notoriety, or personal popularity and to interpret the law fearlessly and impartially so as to promote justice, inspire confidence and serve the
public welfare. The liberty and freedom of the press under our
fundamental law is not confined to newspapers and periodicals,
but embraces pamphlets, leaflets and comprehends every publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion. The
perpetuity of democracy has as a foundation an informed, educated and intelligent citizenry. An unsubsidized press is essential
to and a potent factor in instructive information and education
of the people of a democracy, and a well informed people will
perpetuate our constitutional liberties.33
Justice Chapman perhaps liked the Witnesses no more than the Clearwater
authorities, but he recognized that at issue was something more basic
than one's personal likes and dislikes. At issue were toleration, education,
and public advantage.
Clearwater's licensing ordinance fell, and Wilson and Shadman were
freed. Lost to significance in the excitement of the moment was the fact
that, although the Anderson decision of 1920 had held a similar permit
ordinance unconstitutional and the United States Supreme Court had
made the Anderson doctrine applicable throughout the nation in Lovell v.
City of Griffin 4 in 1938, as late as 1941 the officials in Clearwater administered an ordinance which was contrary to both decisions. The explanation is that pronouncements by the highest appellate courts usually
affect at once only the particular case under consideration, but years are
often required before a general decision like Anderson could make itself
felt throughout Florida. A nuisance would appear on the streets, and city
fathers would react by legislating a rule outlawed by Anderson. Someone
would contest the new law, and appellate courts would then bring the
older decision from reserve status to active duty. Because of the lag, the
Anderson ruling did not prevail in Clearwater until the municipality tried
to evade the spirit of the most recent decision. And one could only wonder
about the prevailing law twenty miles from Clearwater. But the appellate
courts of Florida and of the United States had sounded the tone, and
communities gradually began to match the pitch.
Other Witness cases involved peddling ordinances which were applied to the persistent street missionaries.3 5 The Supreme Court of Florida
33. Id. Handing out leaflets to pedestrians was not necessarily pure speech:
A physical gesture must be utilized to make the potential recipient accept the leaflet.
The gesture might be misunderstood. Or the passerby might be coerced into taking
the leaflet because of the bulk of the distributor. The passerby may feel that he will
be cursed or insulted if he ignores the tendered leaflet. Or, taking the leaflet may be
deemed a prudent way of avoiding an unpleasant conversation or an unwelcome
oral solicitation. The intellectual content of the message has become subordinate to
the physical method used to communicate it.
Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 177, 212 (1966).
34. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
35. In the first such case, the Supreme Court of Florida voided the conviction without
an elaborate opinion. State ex rel. Hough v. Woodruff, 147 Fla. 299, 2 So.2d 577 (1941). The
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at first refrained from delivering lengthy opinions on the matter, though
it usually voided the convictions. The hesistancy probably resulted from
the United States Supreme Court's first decision in Jones v. City of
Opelika,6 in which a municipal licensing statute received the approval of
a majority. Other federal decisions such as Lovell, Cantwell v. Connecticut 7 and Schneider v. Town of Irvington3" flowed against the ruling in the
first Opelika case, and the Florida justices were frankly confused. There
seemed to be a kink in the line of constitutional adjudication.
In 1943, a Tampa licensing ordinance came before the Florida
Supreme Court for a second bout with Witness counsel.8 9 The ordinance
levied a tax of fifty dollars on all persons engaged
in the business or occupation of peddling, vending, canvassing,
selling or offering for sale in the streets or other public places or
from house to house within the limits of the40 City of Tampa any
books, magazines, periodicals or pamphlets.
Freel Singleton had sold literature published by the Watchtower Bible
and Tract Society, and the police promptly arrested him. Singleton applied to the supreme court for habeas corpus at trial but before conviction
in municipal court.
Justice Terrell wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court of Florida
and concentrated on the central question at bar, viz., "whether or not the
quoted ordinance is applicable to the sales and distribution of literature
relating to one's religious beliefs.'4 For Terrell religious practices were
usually legitimate, and as such they could not be detrimental to the safety
and convenience of the people at large. The customs and habits of a people
conditioned and dictated which public acts would be acceptable.
Every system of law rests on a corresponding system of
ethics that directs its course ....

We are commited to a free exer-

cise of religious opinion but since our system of law rests on
Christian ethics one would not be permitted to set up a harem
and practice polygamy in Florida under the guise of religious
freedom because polygamy is contrary to approved moral standards. If our law were predicated on Mohammedan ethics, the
converse would be true. If it were predicated on pagan ethics, I
could sell my child as a slave and if predicated on still another
system and I belonged to the sect known as Dukhobors, I would
be permitted to traverse the highways nude under the guise of
religion but not so in our country because our system or moral
court simply said that the questioned Tampa ordinance licensing peddlers did not apply to
Jehovah's Witnesses.

36. 316 U.S. 584 (1942). For comment, see Note, Freedom of Expression in Noncommercial Publications,41 MIcH. L. REV. 323 (1942).
37. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
38. 308 U.S 147 (1939).
39. State ex rel. Singletonv. Woodruff, 153 Fla. 84, 13 So.2d 704 (1943).
40. Id., at 86, 13 So.2d at 705.
41. Id.
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teaching
raises a different standard that the law must conform
42
to.

Law, then, confined religious practices within certain bounds, but the
same law gave special preference to the free exercise of religion as one of
the civil liberties. And the reason religion and the press were immunized
from governmental interference was not difficult to fathom.
The authors of the Bill of Rights descended from ancestors who
had been persecuted and condemned to rot in jail for indulging
religious and secular beliefs. It took them a thousand years to
wrest these liberties from arbitrary kings, hence the inhibition
against any attempt to shackle the conscience.4"
But beyond religion's own peculiar innate value, freedom of religion
and religious beliefs served society.
A liberated conscience is as essential to a robust democracy as
blood is to the human body. Enslave the conscience and democracy will perish as certainly as the body will perish when the
blood ceases to circulate. The church, the press, and the assembly
were set apart by the Bill of Rights to educate the mass conscience and give wings to public opinion. But the church and the
press were not liberated from governmental interference carte
blanche; to their liberty was attached an obligation to the public
on parity with the freedom given.44
Freedom of conscience and religious expression predated Florida's
Declaration of Rights and the common law. Justice Terrell gave the
doctrine Biblical basis when he noted that "Peter and John first invoked
it when they were commanded by the high priest and theRoman rulers to
speak and teach no more in the name of the Lord." 4
So the soil from which it springs like many other cherished precepts of the common law reach [sic] back to Hebrew origin and
historically reveal [sic] why a free press, speech, and religion
are in a preferred class, protected by the State and Federal Constitutions and immunized from change by the State.46
The claims for free exercise of religion extended far into history, though
the Tampa civil authorities were no more tolerant of Jehovah's Witnesses
in 1943 than the religious leaders of the first century were tolerant of the
apostles Peter and John. The difference in the two situations, however,
was the recognition by the Florida court that the Witness claims were not
only legal but just, and Peter and John, as Terrell would no doubt have
admitted proudly, lacked such a sympathetic source of appeal. 7
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
'47.

Id. at 87, 13
Id.
Id., 13 So.2d
Id. at 88, 13
Id.
The right of

So.2d at 705.
at 705-06.
So.2d at 706.
free speech'on the streets:
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Justice Terrell and the concurring justices were adamant on the practical function religion served in society.4"
Our whole theory of democratic polity as well as law rests on like
moral standards and the church is a medium by which they are
*refined. Social regeneration is not measured by gadgets, sport
suits, a chicken in every pot, and two cars in every garage;
neither is it inherited like blue eyes and a stomach that will dissolve nails. It is tested by spiritual response, self-discipline, a
willingness to sacrifice, and a wholesome repect for the sanctity
of the individual, his equality before the law, his abhorrence of
privilege, and his right to a place in the sun without which
democracy will go pagan and turn autocrat. Herein lies the obligation of the church and the press to point each generation the
and failing in this, they fail in their debt to
way to these virtues
49
the Bill of Rights.

The state constitution and the Federal Constitution protected these
liberties, then, not so much for the value which they possessed in themselves, but for the contributions which they could make to society. The
legitimate sphere of operation for both religion and the press was the
betterment of society, and presumably when the exercise of these liberties
became detrimental to the people, the law would curb their excesses. This
position apparently found support on the Florida bench, for the doctrine
laid the foundation for the court's famous opinion in the Pennekamp contempt case of 1945.' But the view would probably not rally too much
support from the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, who were
less willing to prescribe the betterment for society and were more
willing to let the contesters in the forum of public opinion decide
what that betterment might be. Open debate and free discussion of one's
opinions seemed to the Federal Justices a reasonable way to maintain
peace in the community, though to the Florida justices such open discussion was of value only so far as community improvement resulted. And by
community improvement, the justices meant improvement according to
their ideals and values.
Although the Supreme Court of Florida and the United States Supreme
Court might not agree completely on the basis of civil liberty, the Federal
has been hewn piece by piece out of the conflict between the philosophy of the
constitution and the necessities, real and fancied, of preserving public order and
safety. Issues long dead have contributed precedents upon which modern cases
may be decided. Similarly, the turbulence and unrest of today will mold further
definitions for the years to come.
Comment, Limitations on the Right of Assembly, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 180 (1935).
48. All the justices concurred in the judgment voiding Singleton's conviction, but Justices Brown and Sebring apparently did not concur in Terrell's opinion.
49. 153 Fla. at 89, 13 So.2d at 706.
50. Pennekamp v. State, 156 Fla. 227, 22 So.2d 875 (1945). The case involved constructive contempt of court and the rights of free speech and press. The "obligatory" nature
of the right of free speech was denied when the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Florida justices on appeal. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
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Justices probably would have accepted the judgment of their Florida
brethren that the Tampa ordinance as applied unduly restricted religious
freedom. As long as the application of the ordinance was unrelated to
some legitimate end, the Tampa authorities could not require the Witnesses to pay the license fee.
In other words, one cannot be prohibited from strewing his religious wares up and down the street and from house to house;
at the same time one would not be permitted to speak, practice,
or distribute under the guise of religion that which endangers
public morals or public health nor would one be permitted to
speak, practice, or distribute his religious beliefs in places or at
times that would endanger public safety and convenience. 5
The Florida Declaration of Rights and the fourteenth amendment permitted regulations on time, place, and manner of use of the streets in the
interest of public safety, but "this must be by general non-discriminatory
legislation unhampered by the arbitrary will of any one." 52
Again, the requirement was reasonableness, but to pass review the
ordinance had to be directly related to a legitimate end of government.
Cities could govern their streets, and public passage still came first. But
given the importance of free expression to society, ordinances which
limited or abridged this free expression had to embody good intentions
and to reflect a real regulatory need. The Tampa common licensing statute
lacked both.
To confer a free exercise of religious profession charged with an
obligation like this and then lay a heavy tax on the performance
of the obligation when no question of morals, safety, and convenience is involved is contrary to the letter and spirit of the
Declaration of Rights. The ordinance drawn in question cannot
therefore be enforced ..
3.

.
UNION

ACTIVITIES

So far, the ordinances challenged before the Supreme Court of
Florida had involved permits, license fees, and general regulation. The
court had yet to rule on an absolute and blanket prohibition with respect
to the streets, though each previous decision had emphasized the reasonableness which each ordinance should possess.
In 1943, Van Pittman sought a writ of habeas corpus against the
officials of the City of Perry. He had violated an ordinance forbidding
any union solicitation whatsoever on the streets of the town or in any
public or private place. 4 The ban was complete, and the aim obvious.
51. 153 Fla. at 88-89, 13 So.2d at 706.
52. Id.
53. Id., 13 So.2d at 706-07.
54. Pittman v. Nix, 152 Fla. 378, 11 So.2d 791 (1943). The arrest came under section 3
of the ordinance:
That it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to solicit or attempt
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The city officials of Perry wished to discourage union activity in the declining timber industry of their community. Business problems were already overwhelming without further complicating the picture with unions,
collective bargaining and higher wages. Just as the Supreme Court of
Florida noticed the purpose of the Perry ordinance, it also recalled the
rights of free speech and the stated public policy favoring organized labor.
The city could regulate street solicitation in the interest of public
safety and convenience, but "there is nothing in the ordinance now before
us [the court] which indicates that any of the purposes of the ordinance
were to prevent the obstruction of traffic on the streets.""5 Any person or
business using the streets was "subject to regulation, and indeed to prohibition if such use renders the use of the streets dangerous to the general
public, or impedes the free flow of traffic on the streets." 56 The court
could not understand how
this single act of soliciting a man on the street, or in a public
park for that matter, to join a labor union and pay a membership
fee therein, could in any way prevent the free use of the street,
the sidewalks
or any other public place in the city by the general
57
public.

Passage was the primary purpose of the streets, but regulations
affecting other uses had to be reasonably related to the main function.
Of course if a labor union organizer should take a stand in the
middle of a sidewalk or street and stop numerous pedestrians as
they came along and vociferously exhort them to join a union,
he might become such a public nuisance and create such an obstruction to traffic as might make him subject to arrest under
some applicable city ordinance. The same thing might be true of
any one who used the sidewalks of a city for stopping and soliciting pedestrians who came along to join any other kind of organization, if his conduct interfered with the free use of the sidewalks by the general public. 8
Public feeling in Perry and Taylor County was riding high against
the labor organizers. Many thought them unpatriotic since their tactics
sometimes tended to halt production. Because it occurred during wartime,
some people viewed such activity as treasonous. Counsel had applied the
patriotic arguments in earlier cases with Jehovah's Witnesses, but, as before, the Court was not impressed.
to procure on the streets, in public places or on the premises of public or private
property within the Town of Perry, Florida, from any person, any money or other
thing of value as an entrance or membership fee required as a prerequisite for the
joining of or membership in any labor union or other labor organization.
Id. at 380, 11 So.2d at 792.
55. Id. at 383, 11 So.2d at 794.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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The mere fact that labor unions and their leaders some times,
even when our country is in the midst of a great war, abuse their
powers and privileges, to the great detriment of the general public, should not cause us to deny or impair the well settled legal
right of employed workers to organize labor unions and to use
their powers of persuasion to induce others to join them, so long
as no fraud or coercion is resorted to. But both organized labor
and organized business might well remember the ancient maxim,
Salus populi suprema lex est. In the end, the good of the people
as a whole will prevail, and the old maxim referred to, to the effect that "the good of the people is the supreme law," will be
vindicated. 9
By 1943, thanks to the Witnesses and the unionizers, the Supreme
Court of Florida was able to construct a logical and viable body of law
regarding the public forum. Hostile community feeling and unfriendly
ordinances created antagonism which in turn produced litigation for the
judicial machinery of the state. The Supreme Court of Florida followed
rather closely the leads of the United States Supreme Court, and in a few
instances it led the way. Each decision involving the public forum built
on the principles established first by the Florida court in the Anderson
case of 1920. The Witnesses and unionizers permitted the court to sharpen
the distinctions and to formulate the law of the public forum regarding
permits, licenses, and general regulations and bans. The Florida court
exhibited no signs of hesitancy in meeting head-on the constitutional
issues presented in each case. In its willingness to grapple with the problems, the Court set policy and made law. If Florida by 1943 was no
paradise of freedom for Jehovah's Witnesses, the supreme court of the
state nonetheless had done much to improve the climate for them.
4.

RACIAL DEMONSTRATIONS

The Witness cases in Florida subsided after 1943. The prophets of
doom and salvation no longer seemed quite so persistent or obnoxious as
they had before, and communities throughout the state became more
tolerant of them. ° Outside of labor picketing, the Supreme Court of
Florida had few occasions to deal with the public forum again until the
drive for racial equality created new hostilities and antagonisms, and
eventually more litigation. 61
59. Id. at 384-85, 11 So.2d at 794, 95.
60. As for Jehovah's Witnesses, "We were likely to regard the law that had developed
as one that concerned a luxury civil liberty. It was a sign of how tolerant toward a sharply
dissident minority our society could be, if the minority was small and eccentric." Kalven,
The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, THE SUPREME CoURT REVIEw, 1965 2
(P. Kurland, ed. 1965).
61. One exception to the rule was a sound-truck ordinance contested by a Miami politician in 1950. Applying Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), the Supreme Court of
Florida found the absolute ban to be a permissible one. The court deemed the operation of
sound trucks to be such a nuisance that the city had the authority to ban their use. State
ex tel. Nicholas v. Headley, 48 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1950).
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a. Absence of Appellate Review
One would expect to find a gold mine of state appellate decisionmaking involving the public forum and the Negro movement. The
marches and demonstrations produced arrests in many instances, but very
few of the cases ever reached either the Supreme Court or the District
Courts of Appeal of Florida. While the civil rights movement probably
met with less organized and official opposition in Florida than in other
southern states, still the public record was filled with incidents. From the
plush beach resorts along the coast to the pine woods towns of the northwest, the Negroes strived for better treatment. Why were not the Florida
appellate courts as actively involved with civil rights cases as the state's
supreme court had been with the Witness litigation ten and twenty years
earlier? The absence was puzzling, and explanation speculative. 2
Explaining the absence of litigation is often more complex than reciting the cause of actual litigation. Several factors, however, probably
account for the relative aloofness of the state appellate judges from this
social ferment. First, one should remember that appellate cases result
from trial litigation, and one would only be stating a truism to say that
pressed charges were necessary for this trial litigation. But the truism is
important. Police might halt marches, disperse pickets, and dissolve
demonstrations without making arrests and listing charges against the
participants. The immediate result is the same whether or not litigation
eventually comes about-the protest ceases for the time being, and the
discontent are unable to proclaim their grievances to the watching world."
The police can halt a protest meeting on the street corner without taking
anyone to jail. Without a trial, there simply is no case to appeal.
Second, following incidents which did produce arrests and trials,
counsels for the Negroes have usually been anxious to transfer the case
into a federal district court on the grounds that local police actions have
violated federally protected rights of their clients. Regardless of the outcome in the federal system, the cases are often forever removed from state
court jurisdiction, and therefore from the possibility of review by the
state's appellate courts.
62. The Florida legislature created three district courts of appeal in 1956 and later
increased the number to four. These courts hear most appeals from the trial courts and in
most instances are the courts of final resort. See Means, Florida's District Courts of Appeal,
33 FLA. B.J. 1208 (1959).

63. The point was a crucial one:
If freedom of assembly is not protected on the immediate occasion, it stands little
opportunity of later vindication. Minority groups are seldom equipped with the
requisite funds or influence to render vindication by legal process either consistent
or certain. The consequence is a sporadic declaration of the lawfulness of a disrupted
meeting, the occasion for which has long passed.
Comment, Limitations on the Right of Assembly, 23 CALrF. L. REv. 180, 191-92 (1935).
The demonstration can be a "pseudo-event" to use Daniel Boorstin's term. That is, the
demonstration is aimed not so much at local people as it is for the whole nation, via the mass

media. D.
(1962).

BOORSTN,

THE IMAGE; OR, WHAT HAPPENED TO THE AMERICAN DPaE
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Third, in those cases which remain in the state court system, local
prosecutors sometimes try to make a "deal" with the arrested Negroes
so that the state will not have to prosecute on perhaps constitutionally
dubious charges. But here, even though the civil rights activists suffer
no criminal penalties, the police have been successful in silencing their
protest, regardless of the legal justification either for the police action or
for that of the demonstrators.
Fourth, a conviction arising from a march or demonstration often
might get only as far as the circuit court for the county, and there the
judge would likely affirm the conviction. To appeal to a district court of
appeal, a writ of certiorari would then be necessary, and the district court
could preclude further review simply by refusing the writ. This tool kept
many troublesome, emotion-arousing, and politically electric cases from
the hands of the appellate courts, and allowed the judges an opportunity
to avoid having to make politically unpopular decisions or perhaps to skirt
the central issues altogether. Although records were scanty, some informed
sources attributed this negative outlook to the district courts, and perhaps
one cause in part lay at the ballot box.
The judges were part of an elective judiciary, and despite the absence of successful challengers to the posts at election time, some claimed
that the Florida judges were especially conscious of the polling booth."
A decade without a successful primary or election challenge was no
guarantee that a winning candidate was not around the next curve, waiting for the right politically unpopular decision on which to build a campaign. The judges knew that they had arrived on the bench by appointment, but interviews indicated that they felt vulnerable at the polls. So,
given the emotional nature of the race issue, perhaps one could 5expect
the wise and the cunning to avoid the question whenever possible.1
b. Racial Economic Pressures
But elections or no elections, the District Court of Appeals, Second
District, reviewed two court orders halting picketing of businesses. In the
first case, the Young Adults for Progressive Action picketed B&B Cash
Grocery Stores in Tampa, protesting alleged racial discrimination in the
hiring policy of the chain, since no Negroes were employed in other than
menial tasks. The organization pressed demands for better jobs for the
colored, and then issued a threat by letter.
If we have not heard from you by the aforementioned date, we
64. The story of judicial selection in Florida is available in E.

BASHFUL,

THE FLORIDA

A STUDY IN JUDICIAL SELECTION (1958).
65. True, an appointive judiciary in Florida, immune to threats at the polls, might not
have produced policy decisions supporting Negroes in their quest for civil rights. After all,
appointed federal district judges in the South have not always been anxious to aid the Negro.
See J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN (1961). But removal of the test at the ballot
box might have encouraged the state judges to accept more civil rights cases for review, and
to decide them on their merits.
SUPREME COURT:
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shall have no alternative but to bring this matter to the attention
of Negro citizens, and ask them to boycott the B & B Supermarkets. 6
B&B failed to respond affirmatively, and Young Adults commenced picketing which was entirely peaceful. Pickets carried placards reading:
"QUALIFIED NEGROES CAN'T WORK HERE. DON'T BUY AT
B&B; LETS [sic] NOT BUY AT B&B UNTIL WE GET BETTER
JOBS." The Negroes also spoke personally to prospective customers, asking them not to enter the stores, though the personal remarks were cordial
and without overt threats or coercion. After eight months of picketing, the
loss of sales exceeded $100,000, and the management secured a circuit
court injunction against further picketing by Young Adults.
The district court applied a principle essentially culled from the
state's labor law of picketing: the doctrine of unlawful purpose. Under
this doctrine, as refined by numerous state and federal decisions, even
peaceful picketing was enjoinable if the aim or goal of the picketers ran
contrary to a statute or to expressed public policy. 7 The doctrine had its
birth in an instance where picketing was about to force an employer to
break a criminal statute, but in later cases the courts expanded the rule
to include picketing contrary to public policy even where there was no
criminal penalty attached.6 8
So, in the absence of a statute, the court dictated the proper public
policy in the matter, quoting from a federal opinion:
The right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, includes
the right to work and earn an honest living; but it does not include the right to work for any particular individual without the
latter's consent. One man's right to work stops short of the other
fellow's right to hire him. 9
B&B Grocery was free to pursue the hiring policy which the management
chose, and the power of the state stood behind the store to guarantee its
right to this decision. Since the picketing by Young Adults ran counter
66. Young Adults for Progressive Action v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, 151 So.2d 877,
878 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
67. "The unlawful state purpose test was utilized because the majority of the Supreme
Court declined to enter the battlefield of labor-management relations." Comment, Picketing
Enjoinable as Interference with Business Relations, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 677, 686 (1964).
The Supreme Court of Florida first applied the unlawful purpose doctrine in Plumbing
Local 519 v. Robertson, 44 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950). For elaboration, see Gramling, The Development of Florida Labor Law, 7 MiAmI L.Q. 188 (1953), and Kanner & Corcoran, Florida
Employment Peace Statute-Compelling Union Recognition, 4 MiAMu L.Q. 161 (1950). A
good summary of the federal cases is contained in Jones, Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass,
Alasl Amidst Confusion, A Consistent Principle, 29 So. CALIF. L. REV. 137 (1956).
68. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Building Local 262
v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Teamsters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950);
Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957). See generally Price, Picketing-A Legal
Cinderella, 7 U. FLA. L. REV. 143 (1954).
69. Van Zandt v. McKee, 202 F.2d 490, 491 (5th Cir. 1953).
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to this state policy, the picketing was therefore for an unlawful purpose
and enjoinable:
For the defendant-appellee to employ negro persons exclusively
would not infringe on the rights of the non-colored. B&B is free
to pursue its own policy in this respect. Neither should B&B in
the management of its own business be subject to the coercive
action of a customer boycott carried out by picketing by the concerted action of "Young Adults" because of mere non-employment of Negroes in certain capacities. The freedom of opportunity to do business is to be protected so long as the means are
justified.7"
This declaration of public policy entailed a weighing of public and
private interests. There was no mass picketing or violence to cloud the
picture, the case being a simple one of limited picketing against a particularly distasteful hiring practice. The court compared the public interest in non-discriminatory hiring with the interest of free hiring, and
its decision represented a judicial preference for the latter. The effect
reached beyond the Tampa headquarters of Young Adults, for the rule in
the Second District would prohibit any picketing whatsoever on the
grounds that the employer discriminated against Negroes in his hiring.
The unlawful purpose doctrine recognized that picketing could often
be painfully successful. Advocates of the doctrine viewed picketing as
free speech plus-that is, speech plus action which combined to focus
strong pressure on an employer. In instances where the picketing would
force the employer to disobey a law, the doctrine rescued the employer by
declaring such picketing out of bounds. Newspaper advertising and wordof-mouth campaigning in the neighborhood to achieve the same unlawful
result was not enjoinable, however. The theory was that such forms of
speech were not so immensely coercive and irresistible as was picketing.7
Little did Justice Hugo Black realize when he first formulated the unlawful
purpose test that a state court some twenty years later would apply a
mushroomed version of the doctrine to enforce a policy of racial discrimination in hiring. 2
The court was able also to draw support from Hughes v. Superior
Court,73 in which the United States Supreme Court upheld an injunction

against Negro employees who were picketing for proportional representation. But in Young Adults, the same issue was not at hand. The Tampa
group was not demanding proportional hiring, but hiring on the basis of
merit alone. The Hughes precedent, then, while marginally relevant, was
hardly controlling nor even persuasive.
70. 151 So.2d at 878.
71. See Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing-ConstitutionallyProtected? 99 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1950).
72. The Supreme Court of Florida dismissed the appeal ex mero motu without opinion,
157 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1963).
73. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
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In the second economic picketing case, NAACP v. Webb's City,
Inc.,74 the Second District again confronted essentially the same problem,
with only a few additional variables. The St. Petersburg chapter of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People began a
"selective buying" campaign and boycott against Webb's City, a large
drug store concern dealing in general merchandise. The protest began
over segregated lunch counters and discriminatory hiring practices and
continued for five days until a county circuit court enjoined the picketing.
As in Young Adults, the picketers carried their expressive placards:
DON'T BUY WHERE YOU CANNOT WORK ON ANY JOB
OR BE UPGRADED TO BETTER PAYING POSITIONS.
BUY WITH FRIENDS: MERCHANTS WHO TREAT
YOU WITH HUMAN DIGNITY
DON'T PAY TO BE SEGRATED [sic]. DON'T BUY
FOR CHRISTMAS. JOIN THE NAACP'S SELECTIVE
BUYING PROTEST.
DON'T BUY WHERE YOU AREN'T WELCOME.7 5
The St. Petersburg chapter of the NAACP felt that Negroes were
not welcome at Webb's City and set about to convince the entire colored
community. Up to this point, the strategy was similar to that employed
in neighboring Tampa, but here the similarity ended. The Negro protesters used mass picketing and blocked the entrances to the store. Some
even threatened potential customers with violence if they entered the
store. In addition, many attributed to the NAACP the large number of
"undisclosed and unknown" parties who telephoned the store and used
obscene and profane language to the switchboard operators. Perhaps the
management of Webb's City did not appreciate the colored patrons before the boycott, but sales figures soon demonstrated the effectiveness of
the NAACP's campaign. In the five days of picketing during the peak
Christmas shopping period, sales totals ran $10,000 per day under the
predicted level.
The county circuit court attached an opinion to its injunction, meeting head-on the constitutional objections lodged against the order by the
NAACP:
The Court is mindful of the various rights and freedoms comprehended, expressly or impliedly, within the protective provisions
of the State and Federal Constitutions. Among these are the freedom of speech and opinion and the right to protest and to seek
personal betterment. Such are the indisputable rights of these
defendants and of all other citizens; but personal rights of this
character are qualified rather than absolute because the law implicitly requires that individual rights be exercised with due regard for the rights of others who have the right to differ.7"
74. 152 So.2d 179 (Fa. 2d Dist. 1963).
75. Id. at 180.
76. Id. at 181.
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Webb's City claimed the right to maintain its own hiring policy, irrespective of demands by Negroes for equal treatment, and the circuit court held
that government should preserve the individual's right to operate against
even majority opinions:
Under the most liberal judicial concept of our Constitutional system of government there remain, and should remain, some areas
in which private individuals and business establishments have
the legal right to pursue distinctive policies not wholly acceptable
to others, and to resort to the police power of the state for relief
against noxious encroachments upon such right.7 7
Thus public policy guaranteed diversity, and the NAACP's picketing was
for an unlawful purpose because its aim was contrary to that public
policy. Other means of protest, however, were within bounds.
The right to protest the policies of lawful private interests such
as the plaintiff's may be exercised within proper limits, for example, through conventional modes of communication or by
withholding patronage; but coercive and destructive picketing
may be enjoined by a court of equity where, as in this case, there
remedy at law for continuing and recurring
is no adequate
7
damages.

1

In NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., the Second District essentially accepted the position advanced by the circuit court, declaring at the outset
"the rules of law
that the question was "a racial or social" one and that
79
here."
application
no
have
disputes
labor
to
applicable
The public policy was definite and unmistakable: "One's business,
aside from the investment of money and tangible property employed
therein, is in every sense of the word property, and, as such, if lawful,
entitled to protection from all unlawful interferences."" ° The primary
purpose of the picketing, as the court saw it, "was to interfere with
Webb's City's right to an unhampered market for the sale of its commodities and services . .

. ."

The group approached the goal "by coerc-

ing customers or prospective customers into withholding patronage and
thereby to cause injury to Webb's City's business . "..."81
Relying again on Hughes v. Superior Court, the court ruled that
racially motivated picketing of a business was illegal because the purpose
was essentially unlawful. The court judged lawfulness of purpose by the
same process of balancing which it had applied in Young Adults:
When considering the plaintiff's interest in its commercial
expectancies from its business weighted against the defendants'
interest in advancing their social objectives and the injury occa77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id.

Id.
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sioned by the defendants' coercive picketing causing plaintiff's
customers and prospective customers not to enter into or conthe plaintiff, it appears that the
tinue business relations 8with
2
Chancellor has not erred.

Unlawful purpose was the hinge on which the case turned, but the
St. Petersburg NAACP also employed massive picketing and some threats
of violence. The court could have relied on these unlawful means as partial basis for the injunction. Although it did not, one was left wondering
whether the unlawful means somehow influenced the court's judgment of
unlawful purpose.8 3
The court secured support for its opinion from sources other than
Hughes v. Superior Court and the unlawful purpose doctrine. It cited two
cases in which picketing with racial overtones had confronted other jurisdictions.84 In both cases the courts had considered the issue one of public
policy, to be determined by a balancing of competing interests. "In each
case it was held that the policy of permitting intentional damage to commercial interests in labor disputes should not be extended to racial controversies."8 5 With this principle the court ruled in Webb's City that
racial demonstrations which injured commercial interests were contrary
to public policy and-applying the unlawful purpose doctrine-were
therefore enjoinable.
The decision accorded with the rules in other states which had no
legislative or judicial policy requiring racially nondiscriminatory hiring
practices. Privilege, the interest given more weight by the court, "is established by a showing that the defendant's conduct will protect or promote
an interest superior to that allegedly injured."8 The rule in effect allowed
all but the most innocuous and ineffective racial picketing to be enjoined,
without a real showing that the8 7employer's rights were necessarily paramount to those of the picketers.
82. Id. at 183.
83. Judge Barns did not say whether the picketing was coercive because of the tactics
applied, or because picketing was inherently coercive. If he thought the latter, he would
have been in harmony with much judicial opinion prior to Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940). See Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1943). See
also Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing, 35 MIcH. L. REV. 73 (1936). Cf., "[T]here
is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching." Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Fee, 139 F. 582,
584 (S.D. Iowa 1905). Had Barns found only unlawful means, he would have obliged himself
to reduce picketing to a lawful level and means, rather than to enjoin it altogether.
84. Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 A. 109 (1935); A.S. Beck Shoe Corp. v.
Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y.S. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
85. Work, Injunctive Relief for Economically-Directed Civil Rights Picketing, 38 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 516, 534 (1966).
86. Note, Racial Employment Picketing: Availability and Extent of Injunctive Relief,
51 Mxmw. L. -REV. 92, 107 (1966). For elaboration, see W. PROSSER, TORTS, §§ 123, 124 (3d
ed. 1964).
87. Employers have complained that if picketers' demands were allowed, they would
be denied free choice in hiring. On the other hand, Negro picketers have asserted
that they were attempting to advance their race socially and economically, by
procuring equal opportunities for employment. Thus, picketing can inform the

1968]

FLORIDA AND THE PUBLIC FORUM

The NAACP appealed the decision, and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.a However, while the case was pending before the
Supreme Court, Webb's City de-segregated the lunch counters, and bargaining teams had reached an understanding on hiring policies for the
store. Thus the district court's order was vacated as moot."9
B.

Restricted Areas of Public Property

The cases from Tampa and St. Petersburg represented instances in
which Florida appellate courts accepted review of public forum cases arising from racial disputes. But, as previously noted, there were scores of
other cases which neither a district court nor the supreme court of the
90 eventually
state ever fully reviewed. One of these, Adderley v. Florida,
reached the United States Supreme Court.
A group of Negro students from the Florida A & M University in Tallahassee held a demonstration at the Leon County jail, about one mile from
their campus, to protest the arrest of some of their number following "sitins" at Tallahassee theaters. About two hundred marched from the school
and arrived at the jail singing and clapping. They went directly to the jail
door where they were met by a deputy sheriff, presumably surprised by
their presence. He asked them to move away from the entrance, and they
did partially, though still blocking the jail driveway. This driveway handled little public traffic, but the sheriff used it when transporting prisoners
to and from court. The sheriff appeared on the scene and gave the Negroes
ten minutes to clear the premises. A local minister accompanying the
demonstrators instructed those who wished to be arrested to stay in their
places. After ten minutes, the sheriff took the remaining 107 persons into
custody.
The Leon County Circuit Court found Harriett Louise Adderley and
thirty-one others guilty in one case of trespassing "with a malicious and
mischievous intent" upon the premises of the county jail. 9 The demonstrators unsuccessfully petitioned the District Court of Appeal, First District for a writ of certiorari; the district court simply opted out of a
review of the conviction, leaving the matter for the highest court in the
land.9 2
By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice
Black affirmed the convictions by the state circuit court. The majority felt
public of the employer's practices and the prospective patron can then compliment
or criticize, and the employer can act accordingly.
Note, Racial Picketing Protesting Discriminatory Employment Practices, 18 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 488, 494 (1963). See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HAV.
L. REV. 1191 (1965).
88. NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 375 U.S. 939 (1963).
89. NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 376 U.S. 190 (1964).
90. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
91. Id. at 42.
92. Adderley v. Florida, 175 So.2d 249 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
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that the Constitution did not require the state to make all public places
available for protests and demonstrations:
The sheriff, as jail custodian, had power, as the state courts have
here held, to direct that this large crowd of people get off the
grounds. There is not a shred of evidence in this record that this
power was exercised, or that its exercise was sanctioned by the
lower courts, because the sheriff objected to what was being sung
or said by the demonstrators or because he disagreed with the
objectives of their protest. The record reveals that he objected
only to their presence on that part of the jail grounds reserved
for jail uses.... Nothing in the Constitution of the United States
prevents Florida from evenhanded enforcement of its general
trespass statute against those refusing to obey the sheriff's order
to remove themselves from what amounted to a curtilage of
the jailhouse. The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for
the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. 3
The Supreme Court thus affirmed the right of a state government to
close certain pieces of public property to the exercise of free speech. A
street was one thing, and the county jail quite another. But one wonders
whether the Leon County Sheriff would have taken action against the
students had they not been colored and associated with a civil rights protest. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether another group in Tallahassee, more acceptable to public opinion, would ever march on the county
jail.
The four dissenters voiced the belief that the state should make way
at all times for free expression of opinion. As Justice Douglas vehemently
pleaded:
The jailhouse, like an executive mansion, a legislative chamber,
a courthouse, or the statehouse itself ...

is one of the seats of

government whether it be the Tower of London, the Bastille, or
a small county jail. And when it houses political prisoners or
those whom many think are unjustly held, it is an obvious center
for protest. The right to petition for the redress of grievances
has an ancient history and is not limited to writing a letter or
sending a telegram to a congressman; it is not confined to appearing before the local city council, or writing letters to the
President or Governor or Mayor. 4
The Adderley case illustrates the change in the type of controversial
groups seeking access to the public forum in recent years. The Jehovah's
Witnesses and even the labor organizers were usually few in number when
they demanded use of the streets or other public places. The drive for
Negro equality, however, relied for reasons of emotion and support almost
93. 385 U.S. at 46-7.
94. Id. at 49-50.
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exclusively on the mass march or the mass demonstration. The Adderley
cases involved no single Jehovah's Witness attempting to save some lost
souls at the county jail. Several hundred persons, instead, were on hand
for the protest, and regardless of the legal principles advocated by the
opposing sides before the Supreme Court, each admitted that numbers did
make a difference.
Faced with mass participation in Negro efforts to climb the scale of
equality, some judges like Black responded by advocating the primacy
of state power to regulate the use of public places, with fair application
and no evidence of discrimination. The other side, also faced with the
reality of the massiveness of the Negro protest, was more than willing to
extend first amendment protection to the street activities of civil rights
activists. Douglas would have extended the principles of the Witness
cases to cover mass marches and sidewalk demonstrations. The Adderley
case, then, was concerned with the prominent theme of any discussion of
the public forum: whether a state can declare streets or other public property off-limits for certain activities including speech.
The position represented by Justice Douglas probably would not
deny communities the authority to regulate the time, place or manner of
street protests, unless the regulations themselves work to the distinct disadvantage of certain groups. Because success in the civil rights movement
is believed to depend in great part upon mass action, Douglas would
closely scrutinize statutes which severely curtail numbers or areas for
demonstration. While in fact equally applicable to all, such laws primarily
would handicap those who rely upon mass participation as a base for
power and publicity. Black, on the other side, would grant full discretion
to municipalities to determine the use of streets and other public places,
so long as enforcement is neither arbitrary nor unequal. While treating
all groups alike, such authority might actually permit cities to remove one
of the pillars of support from the civil rights program-that of mass
action.95
III.

CONCLUSION

Historically, Florida appellate courts have placed the state's law of
the public forum somewhere between the extremes represented by Black
and Douglas. From the Anderson case through the Witness decisions of
the 1940's, the Supreme Court of Florida generally permitted restrictions
on the public forum only when the regulations facilitated public passage. Absolute bans were unconstitutional unless the municipality could
demonstrate a reasonable relation between the ordinance and a legitimate
95. It was Black's opinion in the Adderley case which disturbed Emerson. "[Tihe government can cut off at will all meetings, marches, parades, demonstrations, canvassing, picket-

ing and similar activities that utilize public space. Or, if the government chooses to permit
such use, it can limit the privilege in any way it sees fit provided it does not act arbitrarily
or show discrimination." Emerson, The Court v. The Demonstrators, 22 THE NATION 704,
705 (1966).
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purpose it would operate to serve. But the social implications and the
massiveness of the civil rights movement drove many Florida judges to
reconsider past views, as there is a distinct difference between a solitary
Witness distributing religious literature and five hundred emotionally
charged Negroes parading through the courthouse square in a drive for
society's radical transformation.
The legal summary is interesting, but the case studies reveal more
than substantive law. The justification for a study of state courts, as this
article has shown, lies in the fact that these institutions make important
political, i.e., policy, decisions. Furthermore, since the behavior of state
courts does not necessarily correspond to that of the United States Supreme Court, separate studies of the former are needed if one is to improve his understanding of the judicial process and of the administration
of justice within the United States.
State appellate courts differ from the United States Supreme Court
in a crucial respect. The former are subject to review by the latter on
federal questions, while the latter is subject to review only by non-judicial
institutions such as Congress and national public opinion. During recent
years the Supreme Court has accepted review of topics in the field examined in this article, thus removing the state courts from a position of
"finality." But accompanying the existence of federal review in the area
of free expression is a related problem: Supreme Court pronouncements
of the law of the public forum become applicable to the individual litigant
only if the state courts give effect to the doctrine. If the Supreme Court
serves as commander of the advancing body of federal law, the effectiveness of the entire unit depends upon the loyalty of the state courts as subordinates following its lead.
A study of state judiciaries where a possibility of federal review is
present, becomes, in a sense, a study of law in action as received and of
law as administered. This study has yielded a series of hypotheses and
near-definite conclusions about state courts. In the latter category, one
may make particular statements about state courts with the great likelihood that future studies would almost certainly demonstrate these points
to be true. In the former category, tentative conclusions or hypotheses are
apparent which may or may not apply to other state courts. That is, additional studies will be necessary to demonstrate whether the statements in
the first category are unique to the appellate tribunals of Florida.
Perhaps a conclusion almost too obvious to mention is that state
courts influence public policy. Cases in the public forum brought community custom into the judicial conference. In Florida, almost without exception, appellate litigation in this field of law resulted from community
efforts to silence pests, undesirables and perceived social threats, and the
degree to which the judges shared such attitudes made the constitutional
path of free expression a rough one. Floridians learned to live with their
eccentric Jehovah's Witnesses. Racial difficulties of recent years, how-
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ever, sparked only occasional words from the appellate judges, and generally these opinions did not encourage widespread use of public places
by those protesting racial injustices. As noted, the factors of race and
numbers colored the usual arguments for free expression-the judges
watched a social revolution with which they were for the most part in
disagreement, and they saw hundreds of demonstrators in place of the enthusiastic workers for the Lord who in groups of two and three pestered
communities twenty or more years ago. Here, the dominant judicial attitudes were only representative of majority white opinion in the state.
Second, vagueness in a judicial test increases the probability of varying and unequal applications of that test. A judicial test is a standard for
deciding a particular type of litigation, and generally an appellate court
determines the test for trial courts to follow. If the standard is unclear,
a trial judge may be uncertain of the appellate court's intent and may be
left with his own interpretation of the words and meaning of the test.
Vagueness permits varied application if a trial judge dislikes a test and
desires to dilute the doctrine. And vagueness almost assures varied application because even sincere and dedicated trial judges may interpret the
standard in several different ways in their efforts to divine the intent of
the appellate bench.
A third point which this article demonstrates is that the presence of
litigation is a sine qua non of positive policy impact by state courts. Before a court can act, there must be a case. Without cases, a court does
nothing, and its impact on public policy is therefore a negative one. Again,
the point is an obvious one from the study, but it is a factor which one
must consider in determining the role of state courts in the American political system.
In addition to these three points, this article has uncovered several
hypotheses or tentative conclusions about the operations of state courts.
These are "tentative" because they may not apply to all, or even to most,
state courts. While each one is an accurate description of the workings of
the Florida courts, it can only be suggested that they characterize the
courts of other states.
First, the cases studied indicate that application by a state court of
United States Supreme Court doctrine can be much less than enthusiastic
when the state judges are apparently in strong disagreement with their
brethren on the supreme bench. State judges may simply refuse to apply
the higher doctrine, or even if they recognize the relevant federal doctrine, their application of it may in fact reflect the spirit of an older and
rejected rule.
Second, a state appellate court's view of the appellate function is
related in part to the issues which confront it. The Florida courts
exercised rather broad review power in the Jehovah's Witnessess cases
but seemed hesitant to reverse the lower courts in cases involving racial
picketing and demonstrations. In the latter instances, did they do so out
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of a conscious feeling that the greatest amount of discretion should rest
with the trial judge, or because a limited appellate role would, more often
than not, affirm the convictions of the civil rights activists? The point is
that a student of state courts should beware lest an advocate of a limited
appellate function hide more basic policy aims. Perhaps a more thorough
study of a single court might examine the actions of the judges with
respect to all cases to see whether the concept of limited role applies in
one field as it does in another. Though personal policy preferences undeniably play a part in judicial decision-making, one judge could conceivably subordinate policy choices in every area to one all-encompassing value
preference regarding the role of his court. With respect to Florida, however, the evidence from cases and interviews indicated that the judges
tended to advocate a limited review function in racial cases in part because
a restricted appellate role served their policy choices.
Third, the elections are a factor which tend to encourage state courts
to avoid review of emotionally explosive issues on their merits. Regarding
racial cases in Florida, interviews strongly suggested that the factor of an
elected judiciary was important in instances where, if the courts ruled on
the merits or accepted a case for review, they might be required to rule
contrary to a strong majority opinion. Several judges frankly admitted
that the possibility of strong opposition and perhaps defeat at the polls
were incentives to by-pass review on so heated a topic as race.
This study of the public forum in Florida represents an attempt to
gain insights into the operations of state courts as participants in the
American political system. The opportunities for further research are
vast, and, given the influence which the appellate courts can have upon
policy within a state, students of politics interested in the interpretation
and application of legal rules within society have fifty fertile fields of
study. The story of the public forum in Florida presents a sort of legal
interdigitation of emotions, motives, rules and actions. Curiously, one has
an image of a circular game of cause and effect which builds and magnifies the situation until it is like a blown-up photograph-grotesque, fascinating, somewhat undefined, and challenging.

